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The District of New Hampshire offers a database of opinions issued from 1999 to present. For a more detailed search, enter a keyword or case number in the search box above.

Brennan v. Brennan (In re Brennan), 1999 BNH 014 (granting the Defendant’s motion to dismiss Count I with prejudice because the Plaintiff failed to plead the fraud count specifically; the Plaintiff did not plead the alleged agency relationship with sufficient facts to sustain a 12(b)(6) motion).

Ford v. Young (In re Day), 1999 BNH 012 (granting the Plaintiff’s partial motion for summary judgment because neither Defendant opposed the relief requested).

Young v. United States (In re Young), 1999 BNH 011 (granting the Defendant’s motion for summary judgment and holding that, under a combined reading of sections 507(a)(8)(A) and 523(a)(1)(A), the three-year nondischargeability period for income taxes was tolled during the Plaintiff’s prior Chapter 13 bankruptcy).

Ford v. Clement (In re Beckmeyer), 1999 BNH 010 (abstaining from hearing the plaintiff’s claim pursuant to the Court’s discretionary abstention power under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(1) because the proceeding involved only issues of state law, federal jurisdiction not available without the bankruptcy case, the proceeding was non-core, and it would be more efficient to hear the proceeding in state court).

Schreiber v. Stephenson (In re Emerson), 235 B.R. 702 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1999) (denying defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the trustee’s preferential and fraudulent transfer claims under 11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 547, and 548 and RSA 545-A:4 and 5 because there was enough evidence to get to trial on the issues of whether the defendants were insiders, whether the debtors had an interest in the collateral transferred to the defendants, and whether the debtors received less than reasonably equivalent value).

Trevors v. Murphy (In re Murphy), 1999 BNH 008 (granting the Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and denying legal fees and costs, finding that the Defendant’s position “was neither frivolous nor without merit, and that by withdrawing the objection in light of the Peerless decision, the Defendant’s good faith is apparent”).

Brennan v. Brennan (In re Brennan), 1999 BNH 007 (denying the Defendant’s motion to dismiss Count I, but ordering the Plaintiff to re-plead Count I by 4/20/99; withholding a finding on the Defendant’s motion to dismiss Count I on the grounds that the action is barred by the statute of limitations).

In re Borchers, 1999 BNH 006 (ordering that Mr. Borchers cannot claim a wildcard exemption in property he does not own, that the lien attaches to the entire premises, the impairment is $19,623, the Trustee’s objection to the Debtor’s claimed exemption on the GCA stock is sustained, that Mrs. Borchers may claim a $7,537 wildcard exemption, and sua sponte granting relief from the automatic stay).

Peerless Insurance v. Swanson (In re Swanson), 231 B.R. 145 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1999) (granting Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment under section 523(a)(4); finding the $65,000 promissory note issued to Plaintiff was not dischargeable because the debt was the result of Defendant’s defalcation while acting as a court-appointed guardian).

Cousins v. United States of America (In re Cousins), 236 B.R. 119 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1999) (granting the Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and denying the Defendant’s motion, the Court found that Debtors who made all required plan payments and received a discharge did not have to pay the IRS post-petition interest under section 1228(a)(2)), aff’d, 1999 WL 529430 (D.N.H. June 22, 1999).