Osborne v. Rivela (In re Rivela), 2000 BNH 001 (finding that plaintiff had not met his burden of proof with respect to his complaint seeking to except a judgment debt from discharge pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a)(2)(A), (a)(4), and (a)(6)).
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Opinions
The District of New Hampshire offers a database of opinions issued from 1999 to present. For a more detailed search, enter a keyword or case number in the search box above.
Dahar v. Bevis (In re Bevis), 242 B.R. 805 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1999) (granting defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint to revoke defendant’s discharge pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 727(d)(1) and (d)(2) on the ground that plaintiff’s complaint was time-barred by 11 U.S.C. §§ 727(e)(1) and (e)(2), and holding that the doctrine of equitable tolling is not applicable to 11 U.S.C. §§ 727(e)(1) and (e)(2) and that defendant’s failure to schedule an asset did not forestall the closing of her case for purposes of 11 U.S.C. § 727(e)(2)).
Banc of America Commercial Finance Corporation v. CGE Shattuck, LLC (In re CGE Shattuck, LLC), 1999 BNH 046 (denying creditor’s motion to lift the automatic stay on the following grounds, where the parties had stipulated that the creditor was undersecured: (1) debtor failed to meet its initial burden to produce evidence of lack of adequate protection under 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1); (2) property was necessary to an effective reorganization pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2), despite confirmation issues concerning classification of the creditor’s deficiency claim and implications arising under Bank of America Nat’l Trust & Savings Ass’n v. 203 N. LaSalle St. Partnership, 526 U.S. 434 (1999); and (3) real property was not “single asset real estate” under 11 U.S.C. § 101(51B) and therefore relief was not available pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(3)), appeal dismissed, BAP No. NH 00-076 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. Mar. 15, 2001) (granting the debtor’s motion to dismiss the appeal because the bankruptcy court’s orders regarding valuation of the debtor’s property were not final appealable orders and did not meet any of the exceptions to the finality rule).
Ford v. Chen (In re Gahara), 1999 BNH 045 (avoiding the debtor’s transfer of money to a corporate creditor pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 544(b)(1) and RSA 545-A:5(I) and authorizing the trustee to recover for the benefit of the debtor’s bankruptcy estate the money transferred pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 550(a)(1)).
Kopp v. Marro (In re Marro), 1999 BNH 044 (holding that plaintiff, who sought to have certain divorce-related obligations declared nondischargeable pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(15), had not met her burden of persuasion with respect to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(15)(A) and that, therefore, the obligations at issue are dischargeable).
In re Grant, 242 B.R. 800 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1999) (overruling creditor’s objection to confirmation of the debtor’s Chapter 13 plan because creditor does not have a security interest in the cancellation value of the debtor’s extended automobile warranty service contract or the unearned premiums on her credit life insurance and her credit accident and health insurance, unless and until the premiums are rebated or refunded to the creditor due to cancellation or termination of the contracts (which the creditor does not have the authority to do under the retail installment contract); therefore, the creditor is not entitled to have the value of the unearned premiums or the insurance contracts added to the value of the automobile collateral for purposes of 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)).
The CIT Group/Sales Financing v. Lord (In re Lord),, 244 B.R. 196 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1999) (Plaintiff failed to meet its burden of proof under section 727(a)(2)(A) or (a)(2)(5) where there was insufficient proof that the Defendant transferred, removed or concealed powerboat’s engines and stern drives with intent to hinder, delay or defraud the plaintiff, and where there was satisfactory explanation for the disappearance of the property).
In re Drouin, 1999 BNH 041 (fining a bankruptcy petition preparer, doing business through an Internet bankruptcy site, a total of $1,000.00 for violating 11 U.S.C. §§ 110(b) and (c) due to his failure to provide his correct name and social security number, and certifying such violations to the U.S. District Court for the District of N.H. pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 110(i)(1)).
In re Belyea, 253 B.R. 312 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1999) (holding, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 105(a), 363(h), and 1303, that the Bankruptcy Court can order the partition of real property between the debtor and a non-debtor and, under the particular facts of this case, the debtor could partition real estate that he owned jointly with his sister through confirmation of his Chapter 13 plan, which contained a provision for partition, rather than through an adversary proceeding).
Erricola v. Gaudette (In re Gaudette), 241 B.R. 491 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1999) (granting Defendants’ motion to dismiss Counts I and V, finding that the Trustee could not maintain an action which could not be maintained by the Debtor, therefore, when the Debtor had no standing to bring action for conspiracy against the Defendants under the New Hampshire doctrine of in pari delicto, the Trustee, too, was precluded from bringing the action; under the doctrine of in pari delicto the Debtor, as an alleged co-conspirator, could not maintain a cause of action for civil conspiracy naming himself or a co-conspirator a defendant).