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The District of New Hampshire offers a database of opinions issued from 1999 to present. For a more detailed search, enter a keyword or case number in the search box above.

In re Edwards, 236 B.R. 124 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1999) (outlining the standard to be applied in determining whether a debtor’s motion to vacate a discharge order should be granted pursuant to FRBP 9024 and FRCP 60(b)(6) for the purpose of allowing an enforceable reaffirmation agreement under 11 U.S.C. § 524(c)(1) and granting debtor’s motion to vacate his discharge order for such a purpose, but noting that such motions will not be routinely granted).

Bower v. Deickler (In re Deickler), 1999 BNH 026 (holding that (1) debtor’s obligations to former spouse for attorney’s fees related to post-divorce custody and support dispute are non-dischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5); (2) debtor did not properly assert a homestead exemption under RSA 480:1 in personal property award; (3) debtor may claim valid homestead exemption under RSA 480:1 in her share of equity in marital home awarded during divorce; (4) former spouse was entitled to setoff his obligations to debtor against her obligations to him pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 553 and RSA 515:7; and (5) former spouse could seek order from divorce court requesting that former spouse be ordered to record quitclaim deed to marital home).

Judge v. Lomas (In re Lomas), 1999 BNH 024 (awarding damages to plaintiff consisting of reasonable attorney’s fees as a sanction under 11 U.S.C. § 362(h) for violating the automatic stay).

In re Beeman, 235 B.R. 519 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1999) (denying creditor’s motion for relief from the automatic stay after finding that the debtors still had the right to cure and reinstate their home mortgage pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1322(c)(1) following a foreclosure auction but before the foreclosure sale was complete, and noting that § 1322(c)(1), as added by the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, statutorily reverses the holding of In re Hazleton, 137 B.R. 560 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1992) as applied to Chapter 13 debtors).

Judge v. Lomas (In re Judge), 1999 BNH 022 (awarding sanctions under FRBP 7037 and FRCP 37(a)(4)(A) upon defendants’ motion to compel discovery for plaintiffs’ failure to timely and to adequately respond to defendants’ interrogatories).

Erricola v. Gaudette (In re Gaudette), 240 B.R. 649 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1999) (holding that a certain pension plan, the “OFSPPT,” was not a pension plan subject to ERISA and was therefore property of the estate under section 541 of the Bankruptcy Code; also holding that the Defendant was not entitled to any of the pension funds under the predecessor plan, the “GAIPPT,” (the funds of which were transferred to the OFSPPT) to which he may have been entitled prior to becoming an “employer” under 29 U.S.C.A. § 1002(5) (1994) as described in the Court’s memorandum opinion).

Ford v. Ballard (In re Manter Corp.), 1999 BNH 020 (granting the Plaintiff’s partial motion for summary judgment against one of the Defendants, the City of Manchester, because the real estate taxes and water and sewer charges had been paid in full).

Duggan v. Almeder (In re Almeder), 1999 BNH 017 (finding that the requirements under section 523(a)(2)(A) were met since the Plaintiffs’ testimony was credible and the Defendant did not produce any evidence to refute the premise that his representations were false).

In re Hurt, 234 B.R. 1 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1999) (holding that as a matter of law an attorney in fact can commence a bankruptcy case under a power of attorney so long as the debtor qualifies as a debtor under 11 U.S.C. § 109, the commencement of the bankruptcy case is within the scope of authority granted by the power of attorney, and such action by the attorney in fact does not constitute the practice of law and further holding that certain minimum procedural requirements must be met to insure that the filing is proper in a particular case).

Mulligan v. United States (In re Mulligan), 234 B.R. 229 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1999) (granting the Defendant’s motion for summary judgment and denying the Plaintiff’s cross-motion for summary judgment; holding that: (1) under 26 U.S.C. §§ 6321 and 6322, the Defendant’s validly perfected lien on the Plaintiff’s real property subsisted even though the Plaintiff’s personal liability on the lien was discharged through the bankruptcy; (2) only a trustee may bring an avoidance action under section 545(2); and (3) although a debtor has limited power under section 522(h) to avoid liens on non-exempt personal property, the Plaintiff could not avoid the Defendant’s tax liens because section 522(c)(2)(B) clearly states that property exempted from the estate remains subject to tax liens).