Garrity v. Hadley (In re Hadley), 239 B.R. 433 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1999) (holding that the defendant’s obligation to indemnify the ex-spouse plaintiff against payment of a joint marital debt, an obligation that arose from a divorce decree, is nondischargeable pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(15) and stating that the debtor bears the burden of production with respect to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(15)(A), the creditor bears the burden of production and persuasion with respect to all other elements of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(15), and the creditor bears the ultimate burden of persuasion with respect to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(15)(A)).
You are here
Opinions
The District of New Hampshire offers a database of opinions issued from 1999 to present. For a more detailed search, enter a keyword or case number in the search box above.
Ford v. Ballard (In re Manter Corp.), 240 B.R. 661 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1999) (“Ballard”) (granting summary judgment in favor of the Trustee and denying the Defendant’s summary judgment motion; finding that N.H. RSA 511-A is inapplicable to a post-judgment attachment since section 511-A:1 specifically states that chapter 511 applies only to prejudgment attachments; also finding that the use of the term “mesne process” is broad enough to contemplate post-judgment attachments, and therefore post-judgment attachments are available to parties in litigation in New Hampshire; however, adopting the reasoning in Dionne v. Bouley, 757 F.2d 1344 (1st Cir. 1985), the Court held that service on the Defendant was required for a valid attachment and since it was not made, the attachment was invalid).
Ford v. Ballard (In re Manter Corp.), 240 B.R. 658 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1999) (“Kubisek”) (granting the Trustee’s motion for summary judgment and finding that the trustee process was invalid: N.H. RSA 512, the trustee process statute, must be complied with in order to charge the trustee and, in turn, have a claim against the assets held by the trustee; therefore, since the disclosure statements were not filed with the court, the trustee process was invalid; also finding that the trustee process, if valid, would be junior to the amount preserved to the bankruptcy estate and the remaining portion of the IRS secured claim).
In re Dore, 1999 BNH 028 (establishing a two-part standard for considering evidence in valuing property for the purpose of determining to what extent a lien may be avoided pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(2) and concluding that the debtor may partially avoid the creditor’s lien after valuing the debtor’s residence as of the petition date).
In re Conner, 242 B.R. 794 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1999) (holding that a provision contained in the debtor’s Chapter 13 plan stating that confirmation shall constitute a finding that the repayment of the debtor’s student loan creditors would be an undue hardship and that such debt shall be excepted from discharge in accordance with 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) is impermissible and therefore precludes confirmation on the ground that such a provision does not satisfy the requirements of 11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a)(8) and 1325(a)(1), notwithstanding the fact that the relevant creditors did not affirmatively object).
Bower v. Deickler (In re Deickler), 1999 BNH 026 (holding that (1) debtor’s obligations to former spouse for attorney’s fees related to post-divorce custody and support dispute are non-dischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5); (2) debtor did not properly assert a homestead exemption under RSA 480:1 in personal property award; (3) debtor may claim valid homestead exemption under RSA 480:1 in her share of equity in marital home awarded during divorce; (4) former spouse was entitled to setoff his obligations to debtor against her obligations to him pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 553 and RSA 515:7; and (5) former spouse could seek order from divorce court requesting that former spouse be ordered to record quitclaim deed to marital home).
In re Edwards, 236 B.R. 124 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1999) (outlining the standard to be applied in determining whether a debtor’s motion to vacate a discharge order should be granted pursuant to FRBP 9024 and FRCP 60(b)(6) for the purpose of allowing an enforceable reaffirmation agreement under 11 U.S.C. § 524(c)(1) and granting debtor’s motion to vacate his discharge order for such a purpose, but noting that such motions will not be routinely granted).
Judge v. Lomas (In re Lomas), 1999 BNH 024 (awarding damages to plaintiff consisting of reasonable attorney’s fees as a sanction under 11 U.S.C. § 362(h) for violating the automatic stay).
In re Beeman, 235 B.R. 519 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1999) (denying creditor’s motion for relief from the automatic stay after finding that the debtors still had the right to cure and reinstate their home mortgage pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1322(c)(1) following a foreclosure auction but before the foreclosure sale was complete, and noting that § 1322(c)(1), as added by the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, statutorily reverses the holding of In re Hazleton, 137 B.R. 560 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1992) as applied to Chapter 13 debtors).
Judge v. Lomas (In re Judge), 1999 BNH 022 (awarding sanctions under FRBP 7037 and FRCP 37(a)(4)(A) upon defendants’ motion to compel discovery for plaintiffs’ failure to timely and to adequately respond to defendants’ interrogatories).