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The District of New Hampshire offers a database of opinions issued from 1999 to present. For a more detailed search, enter a keyword or case number in the search box above.

HP Family Fed. Credit Union v. Oakley (In re Oakley), 1999 BNH 035 (denying plaintiff’s complaint seeking to except three debts from discharge pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(B)).

Smith v. Anderson (In re Anderson), 1999 BNH 034 (finding three divorce-related debts owed to the ex-spouse plaintiff from the debtor to be in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support and therefore nondischargeable pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) and finding that the plaintiff had not met her burden of persuasion under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(15)(A) with respect to two other divorce-related debts and therefore concluding that the two debts are dischargeable).

Fischbein v. Armstrong (In re Armstrong), 1999 BNH 033 (denying plaintiff’s complaint seeking to except from discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) an alleged obligation of the debtor to the plaintiff relating to a plumbing and heating subcontract).

Fischbein v. Armstrong (In re Armstrong), 1999 BNH 032 (denying plaintiff’s complaint seeking to deny the debtor’s discharge under 11 U.S.C. §§ 727(a)(2) and (a)(4)(A) for the debtor’s failure to disclose certain assets on his bankruptcy petition).

Garrity v. Hadley (In re Hadley), 239 B.R. 433 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1999) (holding that the defendant’s obligation to indemnify the ex-spouse plaintiff against payment of a joint marital debt, an obligation that arose from a divorce decree, is nondischargeable pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(15) and stating that the debtor bears the burden of production with respect to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(15)(A), the creditor bears the burden of production and persuasion with respect to all other elements of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(15), and the creditor bears the ultimate burden of persuasion with respect to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(15)(A)). 

Ford v. Ballard (In re Manter Corp.), 240 B.R. 661 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1999) (“Ballard”) (granting summary judgment in favor of the Trustee and denying the Defendant’s summary judgment motion; finding that N.H. RSA 511-A is inapplicable to a post-judgment attachment since section 511-A:1 specifically states that chapter 511 applies only to prejudgment attachments; also finding that the use of the term “mesne process” is broad enough to contemplate post-judgment attachments, and therefore post-judgment attachments are available to parties in litigation in New Hampshire; however, adopting the reasoning in Dionne v. Bouley, 757 F.2d 1344 (1st Cir. 1985), the Court held that service on the Defendant was required for a valid attachment and since it was not made, the attachment was invalid).

Ford v. Ballard (In re Manter Corp.), 240 B.R. 658 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1999) (“Kubisek”) (granting the Trustee’s motion for summary judgment and finding that the trustee process was invalid: N.H. RSA 512, the trustee process statute, must be complied with in order to charge the trustee and, in turn, have a claim against the assets held by the trustee; therefore, since the disclosure statements were not filed with the court, the trustee process was invalid; also finding that the trustee process, if valid, would be junior to the amount preserved to the bankruptcy estate and the remaining portion of the IRS secured claim).

In re Dore, 1999 BNH 028 (establishing a two-part standard for considering evidence in valuing property for the purpose of determining to what extent a lien may be avoided pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(2) and concluding that the debtor may partially avoid the creditor’s lien after valuing the debtor’s residence as of the petition date).

In re Conner, 242 B.R. 794 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1999) (holding that a provision contained in the debtor’s Chapter 13 plan stating that confirmation shall constitute a finding that the repayment of the debtor’s student loan creditors would be an undue hardship and that such debt shall be excepted from discharge in accordance with 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) is impermissible and therefore precludes confirmation on the ground that such a provision does not satisfy the requirements of 11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a)(8) and 1325(a)(1), notwithstanding the fact that the relevant creditors did not affirmatively object). 

Bower v. Deickler (In re Deickler), 1999 BNH 026 (holding that (1) debtor’s obligations to former spouse for attorney’s fees related to post-divorce custody and support dispute are non-dischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5); (2) debtor did not properly assert a homestead exemption under RSA 480:1 in personal property award; (3) debtor may claim valid homestead exemption under RSA 480:1 in her share of equity in marital home awarded during divorce; (4) former spouse was entitled to setoff his obligations to debtor against her obligations to him pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 553 and RSA 515:7; and (5) former spouse could seek order from divorce court requesting that former spouse be ordered to record quitclaim deed to marital home).