In re Camann, 2000 BNH 022 (denying debtor’s motion to reject an alleged executory contract pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) because the debtor had not entered into a contract enforceable under New Hampshire state law with his former spouse and/or son regarding the disposition of marital assets), aff’d, 2002 DNH 093.
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Opinions
The District of New Hampshire offers a database of opinions issued from 1999 to present. For a more detailed search, enter a keyword or case number in the search box above.
Neveu v. Martin (In re Martin), 2000 BNH 020 (holding that divorce stipulation requiring Debtor to pay for certain joint credit card debts was not alimony or support as contemplated by 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) and that the Plaintiff failed to meet her burden with regard to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(15)).
In re Camann, 2000 BNH 018 (denying motion to employ special counsel pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 327(e) because debtor failed to articulate a “specified special purpose” for special counsel’s services, because debtor contemplated using special counsel “in conducting the case,” and because debtor failed to demonstrate that special counsel’s services would be in “the best interest of the estate”).
Schultz v. United States (In re Schultz), 253 B.R. 135 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2000) (adopting the reasoning of Judge Vaughn’s decision in Young v. United States (In re Young), Bk. No. 97-10848-MWV, Adv. No. 98-1096-MWV (Bankr. D.N.H. May 5, 1999), and holding that pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 108(c) and 26 U.S.C. § 6503(h)(2) the three-year look-back period contained in 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8)(A)(i) should be tolled during the pendency of the debtor’s prior bankruptcy case and during the additional six-month period during which the IRS is prevented from collecting debtor’s tax liability, which in this case resulted in priority treatment for some of the IRS’s claims).
In re Weza, 248 B.R. 470 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2000) (denying debtor’s claim of exemption pursuant to “Massachusetts Homestead Exemption of Spouse” because debtor was not entitled to claim such an exemption under 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2)(A) and New Hampshire RSA 480:1 nor under 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2)(B) and Massachusetts common law regarding tenancies by the entirety).
In re CGE Shattuck, LLC, 2000 BNH 017 (determining the value of the debtor’s property that purportedly secures the creditor’s claim to be equal to $1,300,000 through a discounted cash flow analysis after considering the assumptions and projections used by both parties’ appraisers), appeal dismissed, BAP No. NH 00-076 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. Mar. 15, 2001) (granting the debtor’s motion to dismiss the appeal because the bankruptcy court’s orders regarding valuation of the debtor’s property were not final appealable orders and did not meet any of the exceptions to the finality rule).
Bezanson v. Gaudette (In re R & R Associates of Hampton), 248 B.R. 1 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2000) (holding that Trustee’s fraud action, brought pursuant to Rule 60(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, against a law firm that allegedly failed to disclose prepetition connections with the Debtor and its general partners was untimely; however, holding that the complaint did state a claim for fraud on the court).
Bezanson v. Choate (In re R & R Associates of Hampton), 248 B.R. 1 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2000) (holding that Trustee’s fraud action, brought pursuant to Rule 60(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, against a law firm that allegedly failed to disclose prepetition connections with the Debtor and its general partners was untimely; however, holding that the complaint did state a claim for fraud on the court).
Commerce Bank & Trust Co. v. Perry Hollow Golf Club, Inc. (In re Perry Hollow Management Co., Inc. and Perry Hollow Golf Club, Inc.), 2000 BNH 013 (concurring with Judge Deasy’s opinion in Banc of America Commercial Fin. Corp. v. CGE Shattuck, LLC (In re CGE Shattuck, LLC), Bk. No. 99-12287-JMD, CM No. 99-747 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1999) that determination of whether real property is “single asset real estate” as defined by 11 U.S.C. § 101(51B) should not put form over substance, and finding that a single golf course operation that involves two separate corporations, one that holds the property and a one that operates the golf course and facilities, is not “single asset real estate”).
In re Shepherds Hill Development Co., LLC, 2000 BNH 012 (denying the movant’s request that its time for performance under a purchase agreement concerning the debtor’s property be extended on the ground that it had not been shown that the debtor, through the Chapter 11 trustee, breached the implied obligation of good faith and fair dealing inherent in all N.H. contracts as expressed in Centronics Corp. v. Genicom Corp., 132 N.H. 133 (1989)).