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The District of New Hampshire offers a database of opinions issued from 1999 to present. For a more detailed search, enter a keyword or case number in the search box above.

In re CGE Shattuck, LLC, 254 B.R. 5 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2000) (denying approval of a creditor’s disclosure statement of a “commitment” that encouraged creditors to vote against the Debtor’s joint plan and proposed to pay a 50% dividend if the Debtor’s joint plan was defeated and the case was converted from Chapter 11 to Chapter 7 or the creditor’s motion for relief was granted by a date certain, on the grounds that the “commitment” was really a de facto plan of reorganization that did not comply with the provisions of Chapter 11 and was not a “sharing of collateral proceeds” within the holding of In re SPM Mfg.Corp., 984 F.2d 1305 (1st Cir. 1993)).

In re Colby , 2000 BNH 033 (denying creditor’s request for attorney’s fees and costs associated with motion for relief from the automatic stay, finding 11 U.S.C. § 506(b) inapplicable to post-confirmation attorney’s fees and finding that applicable provision in promissory note violated NH RSA 361-C).

Manakos v. BCC Investors, L.L.C. (In re Manakos), 2000 BNH 032 (determining the amount of creditor’s secured claim under 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) and finding the value of the property to be the midpoint between the adjusted fair values determined by opposing appraisers).

Grigas v. Sallie Mae Servicing Corp. (In re Grigas), 252 B.R. 866 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2000) (finding some, but not all, of the plaintiff-debtor’s educational loans dischargeable as an undue hardship pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) and holding that 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) does not allow individual loans to be partially discharged, but does allow dischargeability to be determined on a loan-by-loan basis).

Absolute Financial Services, LP v. Kalantzis (In re Kalantzis), 2000 BNH 030 (rejecting per se rule that settlements of 11 U.S.C. § 727 objection to discharge actions can never be approved and adopting majority view that such settlements can be approved when fair and equitable, and holding that such settlements must at least give the United States Trustee and other creditors the opportunity to be substituted as plaintiffs before they may be found to be fair and equitable; denying creditor-plaintiff’s motion to approve settlement of its 11 U.S.C. § 727 action as not being fair and equitable).

Sherkanowski v. GMAC Mortgage Corp. (In re Sherkanowski), 2000 BNH 029 (holding that a mortgagee’s attorney violated 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1) by repeatedly postponing a foreclosure sale that had been scheduled prepetition and setting a hearing on the amount of attorney’s fees and expenses to be recovered by the debtor as actual damages for violating the automatic stay pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(h); also holding that the mortgage servicer did not violate 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(6) by sending monthly account statements listing the prepetition mortgage arrearage as an amount due).

In re Smith, 2000 BNH 028 (granting motion for reconsideration of valuation of real estate upon new evidence; denying motion to subordinate lien pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 364(d), ruling that value of property should not be reduced by hypothetical sales costs and that existing lien holder was not adequately protected; and denying confirmation of plan, but giving Debtor opportunity to amend plan).

Chapman v. Tracey (In re Tracey), 250 B.R 468 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2000) (rejecting res judicata theory in dischargeability action and finding collateral estoppel not applicable as necessary elements of section 523(a)(2)(A) and (a)(6) counts were not present in state court judgment and state court findings forming elements of section 523(a)(4) claim were not essential to the judgment). 

In re Page, 250 B.R. 465 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2000) (pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 348(f), trustee bound by uncontested value attributed to real estate in confirmed Chapter 13 plan after case converted to Chapter 7).

In re Tsoupas, 250 B.R. 466 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2000) (where Debtor resided in one apartment in multi-family dwelling of which he was part owner, homestead exemption only applied to portion of premises in which the Debtor resided; also, in valuing the homestead, the Court relied on the ratio of the square footage the apartment beared to the entire premises).