Notinger v. Black (In re Simply Media, Inc.), 2010 BNH 004 (granting the defendant’s motion for summary judgment as the plaintiff/trustee failed to raise a material factual dispute in the summary judgment record as to whether the defendant breached his fiduciary duties as a director of the debtor under Delaware law as alleged).
You are here
Opinions
The District of New Hampshire offers a database of opinions issued from 1999 to present. For a more detailed search, enter a keyword or case number in the search box above.
Smith v. IndyMac Federal Bank, F.S.B. (In re Winter), 2010 BNH 003 (granting Defendant's motion for summary judgment as to § 547 claim because the transfer was not "for or on account of an antecedent debt" owed by the Debtor).
Gembitsky v. DeSteph (In re DeSteph), 425 B.R. 39 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2010) (partially dismissing one count for breach of contract and completely dismissing three counts for violation of Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, violation of New Hampshire's Uniform Securities Act, and Conversion, because those claims were time-barred; allowing the Plaintiff to proceed on remainder of claims; and holding that the discovery-rule under N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 508:4 only applies to claims where a more specific statute of limitations does not govern).
Notinger v. Zsofka (In re Zsofka), 2010 BNH 001 (granting Plaintiff's request for turnover under § 542 for rental proceeds and half interest in escrowed funds owed to the Debtor, which was to be set off against half interest in escrowed funds owed to Defendant).
Moses v. Granite State Mgmt. and Res. (In re Moses), 2009 BNH 038 (denying Plaintiff's complaint seeking an undue hardship discharge of his student loans pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8), because the debtor does not face a lasting undue hardship since the debtor can make adjustments to his expenses, has options available for loan repayment assistance, and has education and experience which indicate better employment prospects.)
In re Borriello, 2009 BNH 039 (granting debtors' motion to convert their case from one under chapter 7 to one under chapter 13 because the debtors meet the eligibility requirements set forth in § 109(e), and creditor did not show that debtors exhibited extraordinary bad faith conduct as to preclude conversion.)
M & M Equities, LLC v. New Alliance Bank (In re M & M Equities, LLC), 2009 BNH 037, 2009 WL 5713905 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2009) (dismissing Count II of Plaintiff's complaint against NewAlliance Bank alleging violations of the New Hampshire Consumer Protection Act § 358-A, because NewAlliance Bank falls within the exception under § 358-A:3 for trade or commerce subject to the jurisdiction of the financial regulators of other states.)
FIA Card Services, N.A. v. Karagianis (In re Karagianis), 2009 BNH 036 (dismissing the plaintiff’s amended complaint under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) for failure to meet the pleading standards under Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (2009) and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), because the allegations: (1) failed to provide a factual basis for the court to infer the debtor’s intent when he made the credit card charges; and (2) incorporated by reference allegations from several complaints in separate cases).
Maroun v. Fremont Investment (In re Maroun), 2009 BNH 035 (granting Defendant's, Litton Loans, motion to dismiss as to Counts I, II, and VII because loan servicers are exempt from the New Hampshire Consumer Protection Act § 358-A, and from the Truth In Lending Act; and granting Defendant's, Deutsche Bank, motion to dismiss as to Counts I and II, because Deutsche Bank falls within the exception of the New Hampshire Consumer Protection Act; and denying both Litton Loan's and Deutsche Bank's motion to dismiss the remaining counts of the complaint).
Monzione v. U.S. Bank, N.A. (In re Monzione), 2009 BNH 034 (denying Defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint as to Count I for violation of New Hampshire's Consumer Protection Act, § 358-A, because the Plaintiff adequately alleges facts that plausibly show that the violations occurred within the three-year statute of limitations; and granting Defendant's motion to dismiss as to Count II for violations under the Truth In Lending Act, because Plaintiff fails to allege facts showing disclosure violations, and because the action is time-barred).