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The District of New Hampshire offers a database of opinions issued from 1999 to present. For a more detailed search, enter a keyword or case number in the search box above.

In re Seff Enterprises & Holdings, LLC, 2009 BNH 022 (granting motion to dismiss Chapter 7 case pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 305 because the empty estate provides no benefit to creditors, the bankruptcy filing is essentially a two-party dispute, and state court is the proper venue for the action).

Narayanan v. New Hampshire Higher Educ. Found. Assistance (In re Narayanan), 2009 BNH 021 (finding payment of the debtor’s student loan obligations to two student loan creditors would not impose an undue hardship on him and his dependent within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8)).

Ford v. Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. (In re Bishop), 2009 BNH 020 (denying defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint because the complaint sufficiently sets forth factual allegations wherefrom an inference could be made that the plaintiff's right to relief under §§ 544 and 550 is plausible).

In re Johnson, 2009 BNH 018 (granting the debtors' motion to distribute funds that entitles them to the net proceeds of a sale of property as it relates to the parcel containing raw land, because the parties did not intend to mortgage that piece of property ).

In re Smith, 409 B.R. 1 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2009) (denying approval of an assented motion to approve a home mortgage loan modification agreement because the motion was not a “case” or “controversy” under Article III of the Constitution and court would not render advisory opinion on the modification agreement; discussing three common situations that would avoid having the court render an advisory opinion on mortgage loan modifications, including: (1) resolving a motion for relief, (2) in the context of chapter 13 plan confirmation, and (3) in the context of a modification of chapter 13 plan).

In re Scaringe, 2009 BNH 017 (denying the debtors' motion to compel return of set-off funds upon finding that the debtors lack standing to bring such a motion).

Smith v. Rogers (In re Castelhano), 2009 BNH 016 (denying the Defendant's motion for summary judgment upon finding that restitution obligations are subject to avoidance actions; denying the Plaintiff's cross-motion for summary judgment because genuine issues of material fact remain as to whether the transfers occurred pre-petition under 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) or post-petition under 11 U.S.C. § 549, and whether the transfers constitute an "interest of the debtor" under § 547 or "property of the estate" under § 549; denying Debtor's motion to approve post-petition payments nunc pro tunc to the petition date because the payments are the subject of a pending adversary proceeding).

Naugler v. Carlini (In re Naugler) and Carlini v. Naugler (In re Naugler), 2009 BNH 015 (awarding attorney's fees to Debtor where Defendant willfully violated the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) by contacting Debtor regarding collection of pre-petition claims after Defendant was notified of bankruptcy filing; and denying complaint where Plaintiff failed to satisfy his burden under 11 U.S.C. §§ 727 and 523 and show that Debtor should be denied a discharge for: (1) failure to satisfactorily explain his deficiency of assets; (2) making a false oath or account; (3) making a false representation; and (4) committing fraud or defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity).

Notinger v. Dreier LLP (In re Robotic Vision Sys., Inc.), and Notinger v. Marotta, Gund, Budd & Dzera, LLC (In re Robotic Vision Sys., Inc.), 2009 BNH 014 (approving the chapter 7 trustee’s motions to approve compromises regarding fees and expenses sought by chapter 11 professionals).

U.S. Trustee v. Perrotta (In re Perrotta), 406 B.R. 1 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2009) (denying the debtor’s motion to dismiss a complaint to revoke the debtor’s discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 727(d)(1) based upon information discovered after the expiration of the deadline to object to discharge in Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4004(a) but before entry of a discharge, where entry of the discharge was delayed by Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4004(c)(1)(D) due to a pending motion to dismiss for abuse under 11 U.S.C. § 707(b); holding that application of the deadline to object to discharge in Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4004(a) under the circumstances of the case would be contrary to the fresh start policy of the Bankruptcy Code, the congressional delegation of rulemaking authority in 28 U.S.C. § 2075, and would be an abuse of the bankruptcy process under 11 U.S.C. § 105(a)).