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The District of New Hampshire offers a database of opinions issued from 1999 to present. For a more detailed search, enter a keyword or case number in the search box above.

Notinger v. Migliaccio (In re Fin. Res. Mortg., Inc.), 469 B.R. 487 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2012) (denying in part the defendants’ motion for summary judgment because the summary judgment record failed to establish that the transfers at issue, in the trustee’s claims under 11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 547, and 548, were not of “an interest of the debtor” in property since the defendants made no attempt to trace their funds although the record did establish the existence of a trust based upon the conduct of the parties).

In re Culcasi, 2011 BNH 011 (denying confirmation of above median income debtors' plan for failure to apply all of their disposable income to plan payments, as required under 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(1)(B), after concluding the debtors could not reduce their presumed projected disposable income under the means test because payments on an unapproved postpetition 401(k) loan used to pay in full a prepetition student loan could not be deducted from projected disposable income; one joint debtor could not use continuing losses from the operation of a business over the entire term of a sixty month plan to reduce projected disposable income and payments to creditors).

In re Momenta, Inc., 2011 BNH 010 (holding that the movant failed to provide evidence that goods delivered directly to the debtor’s customers were “received by the debtor” as required by 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(9) and that 11 U.S.C. § 502(d) does not apply to administrative claims requested and allowed pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 503)).

In re Scannell, 453 B.R. 36 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2011)(holding that it is permissible for a debtor to use an exemption, which he did not claim pursuant 11 U.S.C. § 522(l) on Schedule C, in performing the calculation in 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(2) to avoid a judicial lien as along as the debtor would have been entitled to the exemption under 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)).

In re Trikeenan Tileworks, Inc., 2011 BNH 008 (denying confirmation of the Debtors’ plan because it violates the absolute priority rule and therefore is not fair and equitable pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) and overruling, in part, the Debtors' objection to a competing plan, finding the competing plan was filed in good faith under 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(3)).

Notinger v. Migliaccio (In re Fin. Res. Mortg., Inc.), 454 B.R. 6 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2011)(granting the defendants/lenders/investors’ motion to dismiss the trustee’s claims under 11 U.S.C. §§ 541 and 542 seeking turnover of property that the trustee contended was property of the estate and denying their motion to dismiss the trustee’s claims under 11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 547, and 548 and NH RSA 545-A:4(I)(a)).

In re Visconti, 448 B.R. 617 (denying the debtor’s motion, which requested conversion of his case to chapter 13 and approval of a settlement that would effectively dismiss the United States Trustee’s action under 11 U.S.C. § 727 without the United States Trustee’s consent, because the debtor’s request to convert his case from chapter 7 to chapter 13 was made in bad faith within the meaning of Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Massachusetts, 549 U.S. 365 (2007)).

In re McLaughlin, 2011 BNH 005 (holding that a creditor’s alleged mechanic’s lien is junior to another creditor’s judicial lien because, under NH RSA 447:2, the mechanic’s lien arose after the judicial lien was properly perfected).

In re McGrahan, 448 B.R. 611 (holding that after confirmation of a chapter 13 plan that pays prepetition child support arrears in full, the state of New Hampshire may not intercept tax refunds of a chapter 13 debtor to pay prepetition child support arrears under the exemption from the automatic stay in 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(2)(F)).

In re Doolan, 447 B.R. 51 (holding that the Town of Derry and the Town of Pembroke violated the automatic stay under § 362(a)(4), (a)(5), and (a)(6) by sending the debtors a notice of arrearage and a notice of impending tax lien that included a demand for payment and threatened to execute a tax deed on the property if the arrearage was not redeemed, and that the Town of Pembroke was in contempt of the confirmation order because it applied post-petition payments by the debtor to the prepetition arrearage and accrued interest on the prepetition arrearage at a rate different than provided in the confirmed plan).