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Opinions

The District of New Hampshire offers a database of opinions issued from 1999 to present. For a more detailed search, enter a keyword or case number in the search box above.

Sousa v. Wells Fargo, NA (In re Sousa), 2011 BNH 003 (holding that (1) Lender did not comply with the provisions of the Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”), under 15 U.S.C. § 1635(a) and Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.15(b) and 226.23(b), when it failed to provide the debtor two copies of her notice of right to rescind; (2) the debtor validly rescinded the loan and must tender to Wells Fargo the monies lent to her minus any payments made and finance charges accrued; and (3) the lender’s proof of claim is disallowed since the prepetition contractual obligations under the note and mortgage have been rescinded and replaced by the debtor’s obligation under TILA to tender money to the lender).

In re Doolan, 447 B.R. 51 (holding that the Town of Derry and the Town of Pembroke violated the automatic stay under § 362(a)(4), (a)(5), and (a)(6) by sending the debtors a notice of arrearage and a notice of impending tax lien that included a demand for payment and threatened to execute a tax deed on the property if the arrearage was not redeemed, and that the Town of Pembroke was in contempt of the confirmation order because it applied post-petition payments by the debtor to the prepetition arrearage and accrued interest on the prepetition arrearage at a rate different than provided in the confirmed plan).

In re KS Realty, Inc. and Pointe Luck, LLC, 2011 BNH 001 (disallowing a claim by a real estate broker pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(1) as the broker had no right to a commission under New Hampshire state law and therefore no allowable claim against the debtors).

In re Roy, 2010 BNH 031 (determining the value of a chapter 13 debtor’s mixed use property for purposes of avoiding and cramming down his secured creditors' claims pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 506(a) and 1322(b)(2)).

In re Carlucci, 2010 BNH 030 (granting Debtors’ motion to avoid lien under 11 U.S.C. § 522(f) to the extent that it impaired the Debtors’ exemption and awarding partial fees for lienholder’s appraiser having to appear at an unnecessary hearing at the fault of the Debtors.)

Smith v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. (In re Lee), (granting the Defendant’s motion to dismiss a preference action relating to payments that occurred more than ninety days prior to the filing of the Debtor’s petition because the Plaintiff failed to allege sufficient facts for the Court to infer that the alleged transaction was less than arm's length, but allowing the Plaintiff to amend his complaint since a responsive pleading had not been filed.)

In re Davey, 2010 BNH 028 (denying confirmation of Debtor's Chapter 11 plan and granting the United States Trustee’s motion to dismiss the case because the plan: (1) called for impermissible allocation of eminent domain proceeds, (2) is not feasible, and (3) is highly unsupported by the Debtor’s creditors.)

Bogdanov. Avnet, Inc. (In re Amherst Techs., LLC), 2010 BNH 027 (holding that the creditor did not establish an ordinary course of business defense under 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(2) but did establish a new value defense under 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(4), which limited the trustee’s recovery under 11 U.S.C. §§ 547(b) and 550, and awarding prejudgment interest to the trustee).

Maroun v. Litton Loan Servicing L.P. (In re Maroun), 2010 BNH 026 (exercising the Court’s power under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(1) to abstain from ruling on Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, because any judgment rendered upon the Defendants necessarily requires the Court to adjudicate the merits of the complaint against parties who have been removed from the Court’s jurisdiction.)

Duby v. United States of America (In re Duby), 2010 BNH 025 (awarding attorney’s fees to Debtor where Defendant willfully violated the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362 in accordance with the Equal Access to Justice Act for fee awards against the government and awarding a sanction for violation of the discharge injunction under, but tempering the total award for reasonableness.)

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