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The District of New Hampshire offers a database of opinions issued from 1999 to present. For a more detailed search, enter a keyword or case number in the search box above.

Michels v. Sheridan, 2001 BNH 043 (finding that Attorney Sheridan violated the New Hampshire Rules of Professional Conduct and suspending Attorney Sheridan from practicing before the Court for a period of one year), aff’d, Sheridan v. Michels, 282 B.R. 79 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (agreeing with the bankruptcy court’s decision that it had jurisdiction to suspend an attorney from practicing before it for one year, due to the attorney’s repeated violations of the NH Rules of Professional Conduct, on the grounds that the court possessed inherent and statutory authority to conduct disciplinary proceedings and to enter suspension orders and affirming the bankruptcy court’s order awarding fees and costs incurred by special counsel in investigating and prosecuting the disciplinary action as the bankruptcy court had the power to sanction professional misconduct and that power extended to the imposition of monetary sanctions, including payment of attorney’s fees), vacated, Sheridan v. Michels (In re Sheridan), 2004 WL 603524, No. 02-9007 (vacating the bankruptcy court’s and BAP’s decisions for want of jurisdiction and holding that under the particular circumstances the bankruptcy court was not empowered to arrive at a final resolution of the attorney disciplinary matter, absent further district court participation and oversight, because the matter was a non-core proceeding within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 157(b) as the omnibus disciplinary proceeding did not arise out of any matter directly affecting the bankruptcy court’s ability to administer one or more ongoing cases).

In re Metrobility Optical Systems, Inc., 268 B.R. 326 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2001) (granting a preliminary injunction against creditor and its assignees, enjoining them from certifying either that default existed on the part of the Debtor or that, under its provisions, the lease terminated because 1) pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 365(e)(1), the ipso facto clause, which creditor argued triggered default, was unenforceable and 2) 11 U.S.C. § 365(b)(2) in fact cured Debtor’s insolvency default upon filing and, thus, no default existed).

Erricola v. Thomas, Utell, Van De Water & Raiche, P.A. (In re Gaudette), 268 B.R. 322 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2001) (holding that, since pension fund assets were property of the estate at the time Defendant’s fees were paid, Defendant was not entitled to receive payment from those assets and Trustee could recover fees paid to Defendant pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 549).

In re Amadon, 2001 BNH 040 (finding that the proposed monthly plan payments and a balloon payment were feasible under 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(6) and finding that the interest rate on a secured creditor’s claim complied with 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii)).

In re Husemann, 2001 BNH 039 (overruling the Chapter 13 trustee’s objection to confirmation based on 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(1) because there was no unfair discrimination by the debtor in proposing to pay a co-signed consumer obligation in full under his plan; denying confirmation of the debtor’s plan for failure to use all of his disposable income within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(2) as the debtor’s 401(k) contribution was not a reasonably necessary living expense under the particular facts of the case while his monthly payments for a 401(k) loan, life insurance, and support of his estranged wife were).

Bezanson v. Thomas (In re R & R Assocs. of Hampton), 2001 BNH 038 (treating cross motions for summary judgment as motions for partial summary judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d) and denying the motions on the grounds that disposition of the matters raised would not significantly narrow issues for trial).

Granite Bank v. Cohen (In re Cohen), 267 B.R. 39 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2001) (holding that under state law the debtor’s real property, on which the debtor’s principal residence was located and consisting of 59.7 acres of land divided by a road, was one parcel of land, and, as a result, finding that (1) the mortgagee’s claim could not be modified pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(5); and (2) the mortgagee’s motion for relief should be granted pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2) as the debtor’s real property was not necessary to an effective reorganization under Chapter 11).

Stephenson v. Schreiber (In re Emerson), 2001 BNH 036 (granting summary judgment in favor of the Chapter 7 trustee without deciding if the good faith transferee defense under RSA 545-A:8(IV) may be raised by an insider against a Chapter 7 trustee’s fraudulent transfer claim under RSA 545-A:5(II) because it is not a defense to a preferential transfer claim under 11 U.S.C. § 547(b), pursuant to which the Chapter 7 trustee had already received a judgment avoiding the transfer of the debtors’ airplane).

In re Croteau, 2001 BNH 035 (holding that post-petition appreciation in the value of property accrues for the benefit of the trustee and the bankruptcy estate in accordance with 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(6) and not for benefit of the debtor).

United Companies Lending Corp. v. Skwozinski (In re Skwozinski), 2001 BNH 034 (holding that the Debtor and Co-Debtors had properly rescinded on a residential mortgage under the Truth and Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1635, and had properly rescinded on a commercial property under the doctrine of collateral estoppel).