Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corp. v. Weeks (In re Weeks), 2001 BNH 049 (denying movant’s motion for relief under 11 U.S.C. § 362 but ordering the debtors to make adequate protection payments consisting of the court determined arrearage and regular monthly mortgage payments).
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Opinions
The District of New Hampshire offers a database of opinions issued from 1999 to present. For a more detailed search, enter a keyword or case number in the search box above.
In re Brigham, 2001 BNH 048 (awarding damages to Debtor pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(h) because Hospital willfully violated the automatic stay by sending collection notices post-petition to ailing Debtor).
In re Marsico, 2001 BNH 047 (denying the homestead exemption claimed by the debtor and his non-debtor spouse under RSA 480:1 because neither the debtor nor his non-debtor spouse were domiciled in New Hampshire as required by 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2)).
In re Sanchez, 270 B.R. 322 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2001) (denying Trustee’s motion to dismiss or convert and confirming Debtor’s amended Chapter 13 Plan; holding that, although it is property of the Chapter 13 estate pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1306, a potential personal injury claim that arose post-petition should not be factored into the hypothetical liquidation analysis pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5) because in a Chapter 7 proceeding, the trustee would not be able to liquidate a post-petition cause of action).
Nettles v. Nettles (In re Nettles), 2001 BNH 045 (determining that amount owed to Plaintiff by Debtor, her former husband, is excepted from discharge pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(15) because Debtor had an indisputable ability to pay, as the amount in question was being held in escrow, and the detriment of discharge to Plaintiff outweighed the benefit to Debtor).
In re Smith, 2001 BNH 044 (denying motion for relief from automatic stay with regard to Debtors’ business equipment, because September 1999 note, executed by the Debtors and secured by their principal residence, paid off their obligations to Movant under the equipment lease; also, noting that the motion for relief from the automatic stay with regard to Debtors’ principal residence shall be granted if Debtors fail to amend their Chapter 13 plan to conform with the amount currently due and owing on the 1999 note).
Michels v. Sheridan, 2001 BNH 043 (finding that Attorney Sheridan violated the New Hampshire Rules of Professional Conduct and suspending Attorney Sheridan from practicing before the Court for a period of one year), aff’d, Sheridan v. Michels, 282 B.R. 79 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (agreeing with the bankruptcy court’s decision that it had jurisdiction to suspend an attorney from practicing before it for one year, due to the attorney’s repeated violations of the NH Rules of Professional Conduct, on the grounds that the court possessed inherent and statutory authority to conduct disciplinary proceedings and to enter suspension orders and affirming the bankruptcy court’s order awarding fees and costs incurred by special counsel in investigating and prosecuting the disciplinary action as the bankruptcy court had the power to sanction professional misconduct and that power extended to the imposition of monetary sanctions, including payment of attorney’s fees), vacated, Sheridan v. Michels (In re Sheridan), 2004 WL 603524, No. 02-9007 (vacating the bankruptcy court’s and BAP’s decisions for want of jurisdiction and holding that under the particular circumstances the bankruptcy court was not empowered to arrive at a final resolution of the attorney disciplinary matter, absent further district court participation and oversight, because the matter was a non-core proceeding within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 157(b) as the omnibus disciplinary proceeding did not arise out of any matter directly affecting the bankruptcy court’s ability to administer one or more ongoing cases).
In re Metrobility Optical Systems, Inc., 268 B.R. 326 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2001) (granting a preliminary injunction against creditor and its assignees, enjoining them from certifying either that default existed on the part of the Debtor or that, under its provisions, the lease terminated because 1) pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 365(e)(1), the ipso facto clause, which creditor argued triggered default, was unenforceable and 2) 11 U.S.C. § 365(b)(2) in fact cured Debtor’s insolvency default upon filing and, thus, no default existed).
Erricola v. Thomas, Utell, Van De Water & Raiche, P.A. (In re Gaudette), 268 B.R. 322 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2001) (holding that, since pension fund assets were property of the estate at the time Defendant’s fees were paid, Defendant was not entitled to receive payment from those assets and Trustee could recover fees paid to Defendant pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 549).
In re Amadon, 2001 BNH 040 (finding that the proposed monthly plan payments and a balloon payment were feasible under 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(6) and finding that the interest rate on a secured creditor’s claim complied with 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii)).