In re Arsenault, 318 B.R. 616 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2004) (overruling the Chapter 7 trustee’s objection to the debtor’s claim of exemption under RSA 281-A:52 in a worker’s compensation settlement award that had been placed prepetition into a Totten trust account within the meaning of RSA 384-D:1(I) for the benefit of the debtor’s son because the award was property of the bankruptcy estate under 11 U.S.C. § 541 and therefore had not been transferred within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 101(54)).
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Opinions
The District of New Hampshire offers a database of opinions issued from 1999 to present. For a more detailed search, enter a keyword or case number in the search box above.
Cohen Steel Supply, Inc. v. Fagnant (In re Fagnant), 2004 BNH 027 (determining reasonable expenses, including attorneys' fees, under the lodestar method, as a sanction against the Defendant's counsel under FRCP 37(c) due to a failure comply with FRCP 26(e)(1)).
Dahar v. Jackson (In re Jackson), 318 B.R. 5 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2004) (holding property transfers constructively fraudulent under NH RSA 545-A:(4)(I)(b)(1) and 11 U.S.C. § 544(b) and entering a money judgment against the defendant transferee after an equitable adjustment under NH RSA 545-A:8(III) and denying the trustee’s complaint alleging actual fraud in estate planning transfers under NH RSA 545-A:4(I)(a) and (b)(2), as well as denying a fraudulent transfer claim under 11 U.S.C. § 548), aff’d, Civ. No. 05-cv-186-JD (D.N.H. Oct. 6, 2005), aff’d, 459 F.3d 117 (1st Cir. 2006).
Smith v. Daigle-Guluzian (In re Guluzian), 2004 BNH 025 (granting chapter 7 trustee’s motion for summary judgment on the grounds that future Massachusetts lottery prize payments are property of the estate, defendant does not have a valid secured claim against such lottery payments and status of prepetition receipt of one such payment was a preferential transfer, but denying summary judgment on defendant’s affirmative defense to the preference claim under 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(2)).
Clarkeies Market, L.L.C. v. Estate of Kelley (In re Clarkeies Market, L.L.C.), 2004 BNH 024 (granting in part and denying in part defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the grounds that (1) two defendants did not execute any covenant not to compete and therefore could not be found liable as a matter of law for any breach of such covenant, and (2) the terms of the covenant not to compete executed by a third defendant did not require the debtor to prove actual competition between two retail grocery stores and a trial was necessary to determine whether there was an actual breach of the covenant not to compete and the available remedies for such a breach).
Kiernan v. LeClair (In re LeClair), 2004 BNH 023 (denying the Plaintiffs' nondischargeability complaint under § 523(a)(2)(A) and (a)(6), § 727(a)(2)(A), (a)(3), (a)(4) holding that (1) the Plaintiffs are estopped from alleging that the Defendant's representation was false; (2) the Plaintiff failed to show that the Defendant intended to cause harm to the personal property of the Plaintiffs or converted the Defendant's property; (3) the creation of an LLC over a year before the adverse judgment in the superior court was not sufficient to show the Defendant's requisite intent to hinder, delay or defraud the Plaintiffs; (4) based on the Defendant's education, occupation and sophistication or lack thereof, the records are adequate; (5) there is no evidence that the Defendant knowingly and fraudulently did not list all of his property in his bankruptcy schedules; (6) Plaintiff's attorney is awarded fees in the amount of $1,000 in connection with his motion to compel and his motion for contempt concerning discovery matters).
McAdam v. Lorden (In re McAdam), 2004 BNH 022 (granting the Defendant's motion to dismiss the Plaintiff's complaint for damages for violation of the automatic stay finding that under New Hampshire law, the Debtor did not retain any interest in her residence by reason of her continued occupancy of the premises protected by the automatic stay after the foreclosure sale was completed and that the foreclosed property's purchaser's attempt to remove the Debtor from the foreclosed property did not violate the automatic stay).
In re MacKenzie, 314 B.R. 277 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2004) (overruling a mortgagee’s objection to the debtor’s Chapter 13 plan, which objection was based on the plan’s failure to pay the amount of a prepetition arrearage that the mortgagee alleged was owed, because the mortgagee did not have a right to receive a distribution under a confirmed plan as it did not hold an allowed claim under 11 U.S.C. § 502(a) as its claim previously had been disallowed as having been filed late, but stating that the mortgagee would retain its lien and such lien would secure any prepetition arrearage that remained outstanding postconfirmation, which arrearage amount the Court did not determine).
St. Onge v. Zuccola (In re St. Onge), 317 B.R. 39 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2004) (granting the Defendant’s motion to dismiss all seven counts of the Plaintiffs’ complaints seeking for equitable and other relief to Debtors and to determine the extent of the indebtedness owed to the Defendant, holding that (1) the cause of action under the Truth in Lending Act is time barred; (2) the Plaintiffs effectively waived their homestead right; (3) the Plaintiffs do not allege sufficient facts to support their claims of defective notice, breach of contract, ambiguous contract term, equitable defense of latches, unjust enrichment).
Putney v. Putney (In re Putney), 2004 BNH 019 (holding that the plaintiff failed to meet her burden under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) that the obligation was in the nature of alimony and finding the obligation dischargeable).