In re Robotic Vision Systems, Inc., 2005 BNH 019 (June 3, 2005). In reviewing hourly rates and expenses in interim fee application of debtor counsel in chapter 11 case, under 11 U.S.C. sec. 330(a)(3)(E) Court would consider customary compensation charged by comparably skilled practitioners outside of New Hampshire. When objecting to expense request, objecting party must present evidence that expenses were unreasonable, unnecessary or not expended as part of representing Debtor. The fact that a category or type of expense may enjoy wide spread acceptance among comparable professionals informs, but does not control the Court's final decision on reasonableness of expenses.
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Opinions
The District of New Hampshire offers a database of opinions issued from 1999 to present. For a more detailed search, enter a keyword or case number in the search box above.
In re Cote, 2005 BNH 018 (granting relief from the automatic stay in a Chapter 11 case in light of the reasoning of U.S. Sav. Ass’n. of Texas v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365 (1988) because (1) there is no equity in the property and the proposed development of the property had fallen through; and (2) no other offers are pending and the case has been in Chapter 11 for over twenty months with no confirmable plan of reorganization, so reorganization is not in prospect).
In re Gagnon, 2005 BNH 017 (Court held debtor may apply state wildcard exemption to multiple pieces of property. In connection with a motion to avoid an attachment lien under 11 U.S.C. 522(f)(2)(A), the Court examined issues involved in weighing conflicting testimony on value from the owner of the property and an expert appraiser where neither witness was able to testify directly to the valuation issue before the court The Court resolved the valuation testimony by applying a weighted average analysis of the credible testimony presented).
Notinger v. Lemery Dev., LLC (In re Lemery), 2005 BNH 016 (denying motion to consolidate adversary proceedings pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(a) and United States District Court Local Rule 42.1(a) and (d) because the cases involve different parties and one case involves an alleged fraudulent transfer while the other involves transactions that transpired after the transfer took place).
In re Brownell, 2005 BNH 015 (Outlining requirements for relief by affidavit under Local Rule 9071-1)
In re San Giovanni, 325 B.R. 343 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2005) (allowing the Chapter 13 Debtor to voluntarily dismiss his case when a Chapter 13 trustee's motion to dismiss or convert was pending because (1) the Debtor's failure to propose a feasible plan was the basis of the Chapter 13 trustee's motion, and there were no allegations of fraud, misuse of the bankruptcy system or “extreme circumstances” that would warrant denial of dismissal; and (2) the burden to denial of dismissal under § 1307(b) must be higher than denial of conversion under § 706).
Banknorth v. Sanders (In re Cassar and Sanders), 325 B.R. 62 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2005) (denying complaint objecting to discharge of a debt pursuant to § 523(a)(2)(A) and (B) because (1) the loan application submitted by the Debtor is “a statement respecting the debtor's or an insider's financial condition,” which is excepted from the scope of § 523(a)(2)(A); (2) the Plaintiff’s reliance on the loan application is not justified since the Debtor’s tax returns were in the Plaintiff’s possession and the Debtor’s outstanding tax obligations could have been discovered by senses during a cursory glance under the reasoning of Stanford Inst. for Sav. v. Gallo, 156 F.3d 71 (1st Cir. 1998); (3) the fact that the Debtor readily produced her tax returns shows that the loan application was not made or caused to be published with the intent to deceive).
In re Smith, 325 B.R. 498 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2005) (Chapter 13 eligibility under 11 U.S.C. 109(e) begins with debtor’s schedules however when it appears debtor did not exercise reasonable diligence or good faith in completing and filing schedules, the Court may look to other evidence, including postpetition events to determine eligibility).
Cohen Steel Supply, Inc. v. Fagnant In re Fagnant, 2005 BNH 007 (denying discharge under §707(a)(3) because, following the reasoning of In re: Schifano, 378 F.3d 60, 66 (1st Cir. 2004), the Debtor failed to keep adequate records prior to filing and was unable to justify this failure).
Patton v. Town of Orford (In re Patton), 323 B.R. 311 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2005) (granting the Defendant's motion for summary judgment based on § 362(b)(4) and denying the Plaintiffs/Debtors’ cross-motion for summary judgment finding that (1) under the holding of Cournoyer v. Town of Lincoln, 790 F.2d 971 (1st Cir. 1986), the town's enforcement of a zoning ordinance, when the debtors violated the junkyard statute but refused to abate the violation, is excepted from the automatic stay pursuant to § 362(b)(4); (2) the legal fees associated with the actions by the town to enforce the junkyard statute are, as costs of removal, also protected by § 362(b)(4); and (3) the doctrine of collateral estoppel bars the Debtors from relitigating the issue of a commercial reasonableness of the sale of the vehicles because this issue was fully and fairly litigated in state court).