Stone v. Highlands Fuel Delivery, LLC (In re Stone), 2014 BNH 005 (granting debtor's motion for summary judgment -- as to liability only -- that a creditor's failure to take any affirmative action to prevent a state court from holding a hearing and directing that a bench warrant issue after the debtor received a discharge of the underlying debt under 11 U.S.C. § 727 constituted a violation of the discharge injunction of 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(2)).
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In re Lakes Region Donuts, Inc., 2014 BNH 004 (granting the landlord's motion for relief as the debtor's lease of commercial property terminated prepetition under state law--where the landlord issued an eviction notice, the debtor failed to cure, the landlord commenced a possessory action, and a writ of possession issued prepetition, all in accordance with the provisions of RSA 540--and therefore (a) the debtor's interest in the lease was not property of the estate under 11 U.S.C. § 541(b)(2), (b) the automatic stay did not bar the landlord, per 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(10), from proceeding to complete the eviction process, and (c) the lease was not assumable by virtue of 11 U.S.C. § 365(c)(3)).
In re Smolin, 2014 BNH 003 (denying confirmation of a debtor's chapter 13 plan as having been proposed in bad faith under § 1325(a)(3) based on the totality of the circumstances).
Manning v. CitiMortgage, Inc. (In re Manning), 505 B.R. 383 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2014) (holding the secured creditor did not violate the discharge injunction of 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(2) by requesting that the debtor become current on his mortgage and sign a second reaffirmation agreement (to replace an unenforceable first agreement), as the creditor’s actions fell within the exception of 11 U.S.C. § 524(j), which allows a secured creditor with a security interest in a debtor’s principal residence to take steps in the ordinary course of business to ensure that payment on its mortgage is current).
In re James, 2014 BNH 002 (denying debtor's motion to impose an automatic stay pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(4)(B) because the Debtor failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that he filed the case in good faith, that there had been a substantial change in the financial circumstances of his household, and that he is likely to confirm and fully perform a chapter 13 plan of reorganization).
In re Focus Capital, Inc., 504 B.R. 296 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2014) (denying creditors' motion to dismiss the debtor's chapter 7 case, based on pre-conversion events surrounding the debtor's initial chapter 11 filing; and denying relief from the automatic stay because the moving judgment creditors had not established cause under 362(d) for relief from the automatic stay to recover the proceeds of the debtor's errors and omissions insurance policy where both the policy and its proceeds were property of the bankruptcy estate pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)).
Ruma v. Kehaias (In re Kehaias), 2013 BNH 020 (denying a motion for summary judgment that a post-petition, pre-conversion claim for willful and malicious injury—as embodied in a post-petition state court judgment—was nondischargeable pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6), because the state court judgment that the plaintiff obtained was void as a violation of the automatic stay; without the findings in the state court judgment, the record was insufficient to support summary judgment in the adversary proceeding).
In re Jordan, 2013 BNH 019 (granting a secured creditor's motion to dismiss a chapter 13 debtor's petition—filed seven months after his still-pending chapter 7 case commenced—as being filed in bad faith, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1307(c), because the totality of the circumstances—including the fact that the creditor previously obtained relief from the automatic stay in the still-pending chapter 7 case and conducted a foreclosure sale after the debtor unsuccessfully sought to enjoin the foreclosure in state court, and the fact that the chapter 13 petition was filed one day before recording of the foreclosure deed--indicated that the chapter 13 case was functionally an improper effort to reimpose the automatic stay already terminated in the prior case).
In re Ricketts, 2013 BNH 018 (granting the defendant’s motion to dismiss count two of the complaint pursuant to FRCP 12(b)(1) as the court lacks jurisdiction over the debtor’s claim for damages for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing contained in the defendant’s mortgage and denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss count one pursuant to FRCP 12(b)(6) as the debtor met her burden to plead sufficient facts that state a claim that is plausible on its face for relief for violation of the discharge injunction of 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)).
In re Cahill, 503 B.R. 535 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2013) (holding that the value of the debtors’ principal residence under §§ 506(a)(1) and 1123(b)(5) would be determined after a valuation hearing held on a date near the hearing on confirmation of the debtors’ chapter 11 plan and declining to use the value of the residence as of the petition date).