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The District of New Hampshire offers a database of opinions issued from 1999 to present. For a more detailed search, enter a keyword or case number in the search box above.

In re Zenus is Jewelry, Inc., 378 B.R. 432 (Bankr. D.N.H 2007) (denying the debtor’s request to pay certain prepetition vendor creditors on the grounds that the Court cannot invoke the Doctrine of Necessity to allow the payments because the vendor creditors are not critical, other vendors willing to sell on a cash on delivery basis are available, and the debtor’s situation is not so “rare” as to warrant the doctrine’s application).

In re Haseltine, 2007 BNH 037 (overruling the chapter 13 trustee’s objection to the debtors’ claim of homestead exemption under NH RSA 480:1 in a separate parcel of real estate, which abuts the parcel of real estate upon which the debtors’ residence is located, because the abutting parcel is actually and conveniently used by the debtors as part of their homestead as they have constructed a barn on it in which they keep two horses). 

In re Ries, 377 B.R. 777 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2007) (holding that (1) a debtor may use the special circumstances exception of § 707(b)(2)(B) to alter their CMI and/or expenses when determining “disposable income” for purposes of § 1325(b)(2), as determined under § 707(b)(2)(A), only if the circumstance in question existed prior to the petition date; (2) the term “projected” in § 1325(b)(1) is forward-looking and in modifying the term “disposable income,” as defined in § 1325(b)(2), necessarily includes both components of “disposable income,” CMI and reasonably necessary expenses; and (3) an above-median debtor’s “projected disposable income” is presumed to equal “disposable income” computed in accordance with §§ 1325(b)(2) and (b)(3), subject to rebuttal and adjustment to take into account the debtor’s anticipated income and expenses during the plan commitment period.).

Mullen v. Kalil (In re Mullen), 2007 BNH 034 (judgment for defendant because, although an attorney/client relationship existed and defendant breached his fiduciary duty by acquiring plaintiff’s leasehold by assignment, there is insufficient evidence that plaintiff suffered damages from the breach and insufficient evidence that defendant’s actions violated the NH Consumer Protection Statute; defendant’s bankruptcy claim is disallowed in full because it is unrelated to plaintiff).

In re Newfound Lake Marina, Inc., 2007 BNH 035 (disallowing a portion of creditor’s claim on the grounds that it was a capital contribution and not a loan to debtors, and allowing the other portion of the claim because it was a loan creditor obtained and secured with his personal residence on behalf of debtors; the allowed portion of the claim is not recharacterized as equity).

In re Jones, 374 B.R. 469 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2007) (overruling the chapter 13 trustee’s objection to confirmation of the debtor’s plan under 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b), despite the “above median” debtor failing to pay all of his projected disposable income during each month of the plan, because the debtor’s plan provided for payment of all allowed unsecured claims in full as permitted by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(1)(A)).

In re Turner, 376 B.R. 370 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2007) (denying motion to dismiss under 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2) because the debtors successfully rebutted the presumption of abuse by demonstrating that excess business mileage constituted special circumstances, notwithstanding the Court's determination that 401k loan repayments are nondeductible expenses in Chapter 7; the debtors are allowed to deduct expenses for four vehicles).

Notinger v. Costa (In re Robotic Vision Sys., Inc.), 374 B.R. 36 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2007) (denying in substantial part under FRCP 12(b)(6) the defendants’ motions to dismiss the trustee’s claims for breaches of an officer’s and several directors’ fiduciary duties because the trustee’s complaint set forth a plausible basis for relief and the defenses under the Delaware business judgment rule and the exculpatory provision in the debtor's corporate charter were not established with certitude).

In re Dubravsky, 374 B.R. 467 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2007) (overruling the trustee’s objection to the debtor’s claim of homestead exemption under NH RSA 480:1 even though the debtor no longer lived in her former residence in Maine and had not for more than two years because the debtor’s absence, although permanent, was the result of a divorce decree, which incorporated a stipulation between the spouses, that required the debtor to surrender her interest in the residence in return for a one-half interest in the net sale proceeds upon sale of the residence under the terms of the decree).

LaCarubba v. Mooney (In re Mooney), 2007 BNH 029 (plaintiff failed to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that (1) the defendant/debtor’s obligation to the plaintiff should be excepted from discharge under §§ 523(a)(4) or (a)(6); and (2) the defendant/debtor should be denied a discharge under §§ 727(a)(4)(A) or (a)(7)).