In re Universal Golf Construction Corp., 2005 BNH 040 (denying Movant’s motion to alter or amend judgment under Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9023 for failure to either present newly discovered evidence or establish a manifest error of law or fact).
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Opinions
The District of New Hampshire offers a database of opinions issued from 1999 to present. For a more detailed search, enter a keyword or case number in the search box above.
Wrenn Assocs., Inc. v. Hexaport Int’l Ltd. (In re Wrenn Assocs., Inc.), 2005 BNH 038 (granting plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and disallowing the creditor’s claim because (1) it was not timely filed under FRBP 3003(c)(3); (2) no basis existed for extending the time to file the claim under FRBP 9006(b)(1) on the grounds that there was “excusable neglect” as defined in Pioneer Inv. Servs. v. Brunswick Assocs. L.P., 507 U.S. 382 (1993); and (3) pursuant to FRBP 3003(c)(2) creditors in chapter 11 who file untimely claims are not entitled to be treated as creditors for purposes of voting and distribution).
In re Diamond, 2005 BNH 039 (after conversion to Chapter 7, allowing Debtor's counsel's prepetition fees of $9,020.55 because counsel's itemized statement revealed that most of the fees were accrued attempting to avoid bankruptcy rather than in contemplation of or in connection with the Chapter 13 bankruptcy filing).
Kotsopoulos v. Mater (In re Mater), 335 B.R. 264 (Bankr. D. N.H. 2005) (summary judgment denied because state court judgment for disability discrimination is not the equivalent of a willful and malicious injury under section 523(a)(6)).
Desmond v. ASR Acquisition Corp. (In re Desmond), 2005 BNH 036 (denying a motion to reconsider that was filed eleven days after the opinion was docketed because a motion is untimely filed if filed more than ten days after entry of judgment).
Plamondon v. Debt Set Inc., (In re Plamondon) 2005 BNH 035 (granting plaintiff’s motion to reconsider based on a manifest error of law because the Court’s original order mistakenly equated the opportunity to bring a common law fraud claim under state law with a constructive fraud claim pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(B)).
River Valley Fitness One, L.P, 2005 BNH 034 (sustaining the debtor's objection to an administrative claim and finding subcontractor liable to the Debtor for damages for breach of a post-petition contract and breach of implied warranty of workmanship pursuant to New Hampshire law).
In re Skorich, 332 B.R. 77 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2005 (analyzing the impact of a final postpetition divorce decree on the rights of chapter 7 trustee and the bankruptcy estate in light of Davis v. Cox, 356 F.3d 76 (1st Cir. 2004), and lifting the automatic stay so that the former non-debtor spouse could take any necessary action to enforce the final postpetition divorce decree with respect to property that the bankruptcy court indicated was not subject to administration by the chapter 7 trustee because such property was either exempt or not subject to the claims of the chapter 7 trustee as a hypothetical lien creditor under 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(1)).
Desmond v. ASR Acquisition Corp. (In re Desmond) AND Robert Wolfe Assocs. v. Desmond (In re Desmond), 2005 BNH 032, 2005 WL 3116551 (declining to consolidate complicated adversary proceedings in which only one issue is common to the proceedings, the actions arose under separate legal theories, and the actions have neither common plaintiffs nor common defendants, concluding that the potential for prejudice and confusion outweighs any efficiency gains).
Gallagher v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Gallagher), 333 B.R. 169 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2005) (in student loan case, holding that under the “Seven Year Rule” of former 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8)(A) the seven-year period begins to run anew upon loan consolidation; denying in part defendant’s motion for summary judgment because a lack of information regarding the borrower’s past payments and current financial condition constitute material facts in dispute, thus preventing the Court from making a determination on the issue of “undue hardship;” and dismissing as defendants past assignor and potential assignee of student loan as improper and unnecessary parties).