Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. Bank of New Hampshire, N.A. (In re Metrobility Optical Systems, Inc.), 279 B.R. 37 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2002) (denying the Bank of New Hampshire's motion to dismiss Count I of the Creditors' Committee complaint with prejudice, Counts II-IV without prejudice, and the Bank's alternative request to stay Counts II-IV because the Committee has alleged facts sufficient to establish the claims set forth in its complaint, and a stay would be inappropriate at this state of the case).
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Opinions
The District of New Hampshire offers a database of opinions issued from 1999 to present. For a more detailed search, enter a keyword or case number in the search box above.
In re Metrobility Optical Systems, Inc., 279 B.R. 35 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2002) (denying Deutsche Financial Services' motion to compel lease payments from the Debtor because the agreement between the parties created a security interest under N.H. RSA § 382-A:2A-103(l)(j) and 382-A:1-201(37), making lease payments pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 365 unavailable to Deutsche).
Northeast Credit Union v. Butterworth (In re Butterworth), 279 B.R. 31 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2002) (finding that Plaintiff did not meet its burden under U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(B) because neither the credit card application nor the credit line increase form in this case were writings "respecting a debtor's...financial condition," adopting the reasoning of Judge Yacos in Bal-Ross Grovers, Inc. v. Sansoucy (In re Sansoucy), 136 B.R. 20, 23 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1992), and there was insufficient evidence of Debtor's intent to deceive).
Marshall v. Palmer Wilson (In re Palmer Wilson), 2002 BNH 019 (denying the UST's and the Chapter 7 trustee's complaint seeking to revoke the debtor's discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 727(d)(1) because the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidnece that the debtor possessed the requisite fraudulent intent in omitting and/or inaccurately scheduling and valuing assets).
Premier Capital, Inc. v. Clark (In re Clark), 2002 BNH 017 (denying the creditor's claims under 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(2) because the creditor failed to prove that the debtor possessed the requisite fraudulent intent but granting the creditor relief and denying the debtor a discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(4)(A) because the creditor proved that the debtor knowingly and fraudulently made a false oath on Schedule G by failing to list a lease agreement drafted and executed by the debtor as lessor).
In re Donovan, 2002 BNH 016 (denying a debtor's motion to amend schedules to claim an exemption pursuant to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 1009(a) on grounds of bad faith and prejudice and denying approval of a proposed settlement on grounds that the settlement called for a distribution of proceeds contrary to the provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 726).
In re Marsico, 278 B.R. 1 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2002) (determining the meaning of the term "residence" for purposes of claiming an exemption under 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(1)).
In re RDX AcquisitionsCorp. d/b/a RMTI, 2002 BNH 014 (determing what documents the debtor and a third party must execute in order to effectuate a settlement embodied in the debtor's Chapter 11 plan of reorganization).
Askenaizer v. Cutter (In re Big World Prods., Inc.), 2002 BNH 013 (denying the Chapter 7 trustee's complaint under 11 U.S.C. § 549 in which he sought to avoid an alleged pospetition transfer of estate property because the debtor had assigned its rights in the property prepetition and therefore it was not property of the estate within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 541).
In re Vaughn, 276 B.R. 323 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2002) (granting Trustee's motion and dismissing Debtor's Chapter 13 case because Debtor's unsecured debts exceed the statutory limit set forth in 11 U.S.C. § 109(e)).