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Opinions

The District of New Hampshire offers a database of opinions issued from 1999 to present. For a more detailed search, enter a keyword or case number in the search box above.

Duggan v. Almeder (In re Almeder), 1999 BNH 017 (finding that the requirements under section 523(a)(2)(A) were met since the Plaintiffs’ testimony was credible and the Defendant did not produce any evidence to refute the premise that his representations were false).

In re Hurt, 234 B.R. 1 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1999) (holding that as a matter of law an attorney in fact can commence a bankruptcy case under a power of attorney so long as the debtor qualifies as a debtor under 11 U.S.C. § 109, the commencement of the bankruptcy case is within the scope of authority granted by the power of attorney, and such action by the attorney in fact does not constitute the practice of law and further holding that certain minimum procedural requirements must be met to insure that the filing is proper in a particular case).

In re Donnell, 234 B.R. 567 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1999) (denying creditor’s motion to compel debtors to surrender collateral following the failure of debtors to perform their stated intention pursuant to § 521(2)(B) because fashioning such a remedy under the Court’s § 105 power would not be appropriate in this case and suggesting that relief from the stay may be a more appropriate remedy). 

Mulligan v. United States (In re Mulligan), 234 B.R. 229 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1999) (granting the Defendant’s motion for summary judgment and denying the Plaintiff’s cross-motion for summary judgment; holding that: (1) under 26 U.S.C. §§ 6321 and 6322, the Defendant’s validly perfected lien on the Plaintiff’s real property subsisted even though the Plaintiff’s personal liability on the lien was discharged through the bankruptcy; (2) only a trustee may bring an avoidance action under section 545(2); and (3) although a debtor has limited power under section 522(h) to avoid liens on non-exempt personal property, the Plaintiff could not avoid the Defendant’s tax liens because section 522(c)(2)(B) clearly states that property exempted from the estate remains subject to tax liens).

Brennan v. Brennan (In re Brennan), 1999 BNH 014 (granting the Defendant’s motion to dismiss Count I with prejudice because the Plaintiff failed to plead the fraud count specifically; the Plaintiff did not plead the alleged agency relationship with sufficient facts to sustain a 12(b)(6) motion).

Ford v. Young (In re Day), 1999 BNH 012 (granting the Plaintiff’s partial motion for summary judgment because neither Defendant opposed the relief requested).

Young v. United States (In re Young), 1999 BNH 011 (granting the Defendant’s motion for summary judgment and holding that, under a combined reading of sections 507(a)(8)(A) and 523(a)(1)(A), the three-year nondischargeability period for income taxes was tolled during the Plaintiff’s prior Chapter 13 bankruptcy).

Ford v. Clement (In re Beckmeyer), 1999 BNH 010 (abstaining from hearing the plaintiff’s claim pursuant to the Court’s discretionary abstention power under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(1) because the proceeding involved only issues of state law, federal jurisdiction not available without the bankruptcy case, the proceeding was non-core, and it would be more efficient to hear the proceeding in state court).

Schreiber v. Stephenson (In re Emerson), 235 B.R. 702 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1999) (denying defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the trustee’s preferential and fraudulent transfer claims under 11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 547, and 548 and RSA 545-A:4 and 5 because there was enough evidence to get to trial on the issues of whether the defendants were insiders, whether the debtors had an interest in the collateral transferred to the defendants, and whether the debtors received less than reasonably equivalent value).

Trevors v. Murphy (In re Murphy), 1999 BNH 008 (granting the Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and denying legal fees and costs, finding that the Defendant’s position “was neither frivolous nor without merit, and that by withdrawing the objection in light of the Peerless decision, the Defendant’s good faith is apparent”).

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